Testing the invulnerability of a simple SCADA

My boss wants to build a workbench to test the invulnerability of a simple SCADA system against hacker attacks. We have for this an EAGLE mGuard as our firewall, a CompactLogix 32E, a computer with iFix32, two switches Moxa EDS-508 and a computer as untrusted side. Today our Plant Floor network is separated from Enterprise Network, but the connection between then is inevitable. Can anyone suggest me something?

I can tell you before you even start that you aren't going to build an "invulnerable" SCADA system. Such a thing just doesn't exist.

Let's just take one example of this: "a computer with iFix32". I can't speak for iFix32, but I am pretty sure that it requires MS Windows as an operating system. Do you really think you can make MS Windows "invulnerable"? If you can, then you're in the wrong business because everyone else using MS Windows would pay good money for that knowledge.

It sounds as if you are working on the problem from the wrong end. Instead of trying to make your SCADA system "invulnerable", you should be working on how to make the SCADA data accessible in a secure fashion. If it was me, I would be looking at how to have a dedicated "box" (computer) sitting in between the plant floor and enterprise networks to pass data between them. You then need to concentrate on securing that box, and how to limit what damage it can do to your plant network.

Start with finding out what purpose this proposed connection is supposed to serve and limit your solution to addressing that need.

Yes, "Secure Windows" is an oxymoron
since a google search will turn up a way
in for anybody at all interested. Even
grade schools can't secure from users.

Regards
cww

I have to agree with the previous 2 postings but I'll go a little further.

1) No computer based system is 100% secure (MS or Linux).

2) If all your looking at is the security of the iFix box then you're missing several other opportunities to make your whole system more secure.

I am no expert on this but have been through a couple of projects with these issues and am about to go through a 3rd.

I applaud your efforts to address this issue rather than pretending it doesn't exist. But, it can be a lot of work to do this properly. Look upon it as a risk management exercise (don't spend loads of money unless you are going to lose lots of money or lives), do a bit of background reading (ISA stds, google process control cyber security, Bruce Schneier)and good luck. You're starting before the connection is made which is a good place to start.

O.k. I think I can help you on this. I am a Data Systems Engineer, and also I am the support engineer for GE Fanuc Here in Colombia.

First, are you using iFIX or FIX32? Be clear about that (security is stronger in iFIX). No system is invulnerable, always try to get Enterprise and plant networks separated (as you say we know they will merge someday).

Operative systems differ in the security options that they provide, anyway a hacker would find an easy way to break into a system.

If you wanna ask me anything my mail is ingcesarduque at hotmail. com

There are many things you can do to improve security, but until you define the version of the SCADA I cannot give you more tips.

Best regards!!

As everyone else has said, you can't make Windows secure. The trick is to stop anyone getting at the Operating System...

1. Physically isolate the Windows PC so nobody can put USB sticks, CDs, floppy disks etc in the system unit and turn it on. Users should only be able to touch the keyboard, screen and mouse - nothing else.

2. Use a Windows policy to lock down access to the desktop, drives, system resources, network etc.

3. Use strong password security so users can't guess the admin passwords.

4. Use a quality firewall product to isolate the SCADA from the rest of the company network. Multiple layers of security such as a DMZ between the Plant Network and the Corporate intranet are a good idea.

5. Back it up properly. Sooner or later it will break and you need to be able to fix it.

Ultimately, the most likely danger to a control system comes from knowledgeable insiders who have physical access to the machine and the passwords, not from random outside hackers.

Rob
www[.]lymac.co.nz